The Judicial Selection Committee: Q&A

Photo: Yossi Zamir, Shatil-Stok

On March 19, 2025, the Knesset’s Constitution, Law, and Justice Committee approved the proposal to change the composition of the Judicial Selection Committee, the committee responsible for appointing judges to Israeli courts. The law is expected to pass on Thursday, March 27.  

What is the current composition of the committee?

The committee currently includes three Supreme Court justices, two representatives from the Bar Association, and four politicians: three from the coalition (the Minister of Justice, another minister, and a Knesset Member), and one Knesset member from the opposition. This arrangement grants professional representatives the majority vote, thereby ensuring (as much as possible) that judicial appointments are not political and safeguarding the independence of the judiciary. Judges for the lower courts are selected by simple majority, so that a potential judge’s professional merits are the primary consideration for their appointment. The committee’s politicians do not have veto power over the appointment of a lower court judge. Additionally, since 2008 the appointment of Supreme Court justices requires that a majority of 7 of the 9 committee members agree to the appointment, which means that the committee’s sitting justices and the coalition representatives have mutual veto power over the selection of Supreme Court justices. This ensures that the Supreme Court consists of justices who are broadly accepted.   

For 72 years, all governments and Knessets have abided by and respected this selection method and ratified it with minor amendments.  

What are the arguments against the current system, and are they valid?

In recent years, calls for changing the committee's composition have increased. Several main issues have been raised: 

• Professional judges do not represent public opinion, and Supreme Court justices should reflect political power relations since the court deals with constitutional issues at the heart of political debates. 

• The composition of the committee, especially the professional members, has a liberal bias. 

• The committee's composition does not allow for demographic diversity among judges, so it does not reflect Israeli society. 

• The court is too activist and needs to be restrained, and the composition of the committee prevents politicians from selecting more conservative judges. 

These claims are unfounded: 

• Israel's Supreme Court is not a constitutional court, and most of its work involves civil, criminal, and administrative appeals that require professionalism, expertise, and objectivity. Therefore, adopting a political selection model based on those used in constitutional courts in other countries is inappropriate. Even when the Supreme Court deals with constitutional cases, its members should not be selected the same way that the government is selected, because the court needs to provide oversight over the government. 

• The committee's composition does change with shifting public opinions. In recent years, many judges have been appointed under right-wing Ministers of Justice, and the right has proudly boasted about its success in selecting more conservative judges. 

• Criticism that the selected judges do not reflect the population of Israel was a valid point in the past, but there has been significant improvement in recent years. However, the proposed amendment would not help solve this issue—in fact, it would reverse this trend due to politicians' desire to select judges who share their views. For example, the only Arab members ever selected for the committee, who therefore are able to have a say in who is appointed to be a judge, were from the Bar Association and judiciary, never from politicians. Without Arab committee members, Arab citizens' representation in the judicial system will most likely decline. 

• The claim that the Supreme Court is an activist court is incorrect and unfounded. Regardless, giving more weight to political considerations in selecting judges serves only to increase judicial activism. 

What are the proposed changes and their implications?

The proposal approved by the Constitution, Law, and Justice Committee includes several amendments that radically change how judges are selected in Israel. The changes involve several key elements: 

1. Changes to the committee's composition:

Instead of two representatives from the Bar Association, two public representatives who are lawyers will be appointed: one chosen by coalition Knesset members and one by opposition Knesset members. These public representatives will be political appointees in every sense. This would increase the number of politicians on the committee from 4 to 6 members and reduce the number of professionals from 5 to 3. 

Implications: Transferring power to politicians will make political considerations dominant in selecting judges, while professional qualifications will become secondary. This will impact judicial independence, the impartiality of judges and their professionalism, all of which are essential components within the judiciary of a democratic state. 

2. Changing the rules for selecting Supreme Court justices:

Instead of requiring a special majority of at least seven of the nine members, which necessitates the consent of the committee’s judges, only five members will be required to approve the selection of a Supreme Court justice, including one coalition representative and one opposition representative. 

Implications: Transferring the power to select Supreme Court justices to politicians, nullifying judges' influence in screening candidates, and making the selection process part of a political deal between coalition and opposition will allow politicians to appoint Supreme Court justices—even if the committee’s judges object—based primarily on political considerations, without the need for broad agreement within the committee. This will lead to selecting judges based on political loyalty and the expectation that they will not intervene in decisions made by the government that appointed them, even if it violates human rights or breaks the law. The new system will do major harm to the separation of powers, checks and balances on government power, and public trust in the judicial system. 

3. Adding a "deadlock-breaking mechanism for selecting Supreme Court justices:

In cases of prolonged deadlock in selecting Supreme Court justices, the Minister of Justice will now be able to activate a process in which the committee’s coalition representatives propose three candidates and the committee selects one, and opposition representatives propose three candidates and the committee selects one. If the committee does not select a candidate within a month, the proposers can make their own selection. 

Implications: Granting additional power to the coalition and opposition to appoint Supreme Court justices without the approval of the committee’s judges but also without needing to compromise with politicians from the other side intensifies the politicization of the judicial selection process and allows for the appointment of extremist judges who strongly identify with a specific political side, damaging public trust in the neutrality and objectivity of the judicial system. 

4. Changing the rules for selecting other judges:

Currently, a simple majority is required to select a judge for other courts such as district and magistrate courts, so professional committee members (judges and Bar Association representatives) can appoint judges if they agree among themselves even if the politicians object. The new amendment stipulates that the selection process will be mainly controlled by politicians, with judges having only a weak veto right (requiring one judge's consent). 

Implications: Even for lower courts, which do not deal with sensitive constitutional issues but apply the law in civil and criminal proceedings, the weight in the selection of judges will shift from the professionals to the politicians. This will undermine judicial independence and the right to fair trial, as judges in lower courts will know that any decision or ruling they make that goes against one political side could destroy their chances for promotion. Judges might try to ingratiate themselves with one political side to secure appointments through a deal. Judges should be able to make unpopular decisions and protect the rights of those suspected of serious crimes. 

5. Selecting the President of the Supreme Court and the Deputy President:

Currently, selecting the Supreme Court President and Deputy President is done via a simple majority of committee members, which grants professional entities a built-in majority. For years, the selection of the Supreme Court President was based on the seniority system, which was respected by both professional and political entities. The new amendment eliminates the professionals’ majority, instead requiring a majority of 5, made up of at least one coalition representative, one opposition representative, and one judge. 

Implications: Supreme Court justices aspiring to the roles of President and Deputy President will need to consider how their decisions affect the politicians on the committee. The selection process will change from one based on consensus in accordance with the seniority system, which helps neutralize political influence, to a political process that is part of backroom political bargaining and deals. Additionally, this will allow the coalition or opposition to veto and block appointments, potentially leaving the Supreme Court without a permanent president. 

Why is the proposed law dangerous for democracy and human rights?

1. Undermining judicial independence: The increased politicization of judicial selection will undermine judges' independence, resulting in them being strongly identified with one political side. Any judge wanting to advance in the system will need to consider how their decisions and rulings will be perceived by politicians. 

2. Violating the right to fair trial: An essential component of the right to fair trial is having the process managed by an independent judiciary. Undermining judicial independence violates litigants' right to fair trial. A litigant appearing before a non-independent judge cannot trust that their case will be decided objectively. 

3. Disregarding the principle of separation of powers: A judicial selection system based solely on political considerations violates the principle of the separation of powers. The judiciary must be independent in order to fulfill its role in protecting human rights and the rule of law, and in reviewing governmental actions. This is especially important in Israel, where the separation of powers is already weak and most governmental power is concentrated in the executive branch. 

4. Undermining judges' ability to protect human rights: Judges dependent on political entities are less willing to protect human rights, especially those of unpopular minority groups or in cases involving the government. 

5. Hindering the fight against public corruption: When the government appoints judges, the willingness of judges to fight governmental corruption weakens. 

6. Damaging judicial professionalism: Serving as a judge is a demanding profession requiring the highest level of professionalism. Privileging political connections over professional qualifications in selecting judges could lead to decreased professional standards and quality of adjudication, severely harming the public. 

7. Eroding public trust: Judges who are clearly politically identified may lose public trust, as they will be seen as acting on behalf of the government rather than as neutral and objective parties. 

8. Deepening the underrepresentation of Arab society in the judiciary: Politicization may lead to further underrepresentation of Arab society on the committee and in the appointment of Arab judges. 

Is this bill part of the "judicial overhaul?"

Absolutely! This move can only be seen as part of a long series of laws and actions that together will turn Israel into a democracy in name only. Alongside the amendment regarding the Judicial Selection Committee, the government is advancing other dangerous, extreme measures, such as firing the Attorney General and the head of the Shin Bet in order to appoint political loyalists. A law politicizing the sensitive role of Commissioner for Public Complaints against Judges has already passed in the Knesset. The government is also promoting numerous laws restricting freedom of expression, media, and the ability to run in elections. Other laws are being advanced that limit the judiciary's powers and that oppose the independence of the Attorney General.  

The police have already undergone a major political overhaul, resulting in a more violent law enforcement, and the government is working to restrict the freedom of human rights organizations. Additionally, the government is continuing its moves towards annexation and increasingly violating the human rights of Palestinians in Gaza and the West Bank. It is also promoting a Basic Law allowing for the indefinite detention of asylum seekers and migrants. 

It is important to understand that weakening the judiciary is key to advancing these other measures, because an independent judiciary would strike down the judicial overhaul, as happened with the cancellation of the court's authority to invalidate unreasonable government decisions (the Reasonableness Clause), an amendment that was struck down by the Supreme Court.