In Hungary, They Thought Change Would Take Another 15 Years. And Then it Happened
Although there are significant differences between Hungary and Israel, and Hungarians do not have to contend with occupation and war crimes, their experience reminds us that history does not move in only one direction, and that even things that seem irreversible can be changed.
For nearly a year in 2023, protesters took to the streets across the country and chanted “Bibi, Sara, this is not Hungary.” This month, I visited Hungary, six months after Viktor Orbán was defeated in the elections after 16 years in power, and tried to understand the similarities and differences between the two countries.
In recent years, close ties have developed between human rights and democracy activists in Israel and Hungary, with the aim of supporting one another and learning together about populism and ways to defeat it. The question is not only how similar Netanyahu’s Israel is to Orbán’s Hungary, but also what Israelis can learn from the way Hungarians managed to affect change when, not too long ago, change had seemed impossible.
Orbán was the first among the populist leaders of our generation to think strategically about entrenching his rule. He acted in an organized, gradual, and systematic manner to turn Hungarian democracy into a hollow, illiberal democracy. Until 2025, Hungarian pro-democracy activists believed that Orbán’s rule was stable and unbeatable, and focused on working with high school students to educate the next generation, on the assumption that it would take at least 10–15 years to replace the government.
In early October, about six months after Orbán was defeated in the elections, I attended the “Budapest Forum,” a conference held annually in the city since 2021 that focuses on liberal democracy and the challenges of populism. It is difficult to describe the sense of elation evident among many of the speakers. I listened to slam poetry celebrating the victory and the steadfastness of those in the democratic camp, and nodded excitedly as activists described a full night of celebrations in the Hungarian capital when the election results became known. I met high school students who had devoted their school years to preparing to leave the country and are now busy planning their future in Budapest, the city they love and where they feel at home. Activists spoke of long and difficult years of political work that had seemed almost pointless, but that prepared them to seize the opportunity for change when it came, almost completely unexpectedly.
I tried to understand why the economic distress and the pedophilia scandal had such a major impact on the results of the latest elections. Hungary’s economic situation had been difficult for a long time, and similar scandals had occurred in the past. No one had a clear explanation. As they saw it, after many long years of grueling work to preserve a culture of democratic participation and criticism of the government, work that felt like “banging your head against a wall,” the right opposition leader finally came along, and the wall collapsed.
Budapest Mayor Gergely Karácsony, who had been one of the leading opponents of Orbán throughout his years in power, opened the conference by saying: “My friends, it’s over.” Speakers reiterated that Hungarians had managed to change the course of history. They also sought to emphasize to international partners that the populist process is not deterministic and that it is possible to change direction. It was difficult not to be swept up in the Hungarians’ joy.
Nevertheless, major questions remain unresolved. Professor Kim Lane Scheppele, a scholar of populism, spoke at the conference about two axes in Hungarian politics: right–left and democracy–populism. While the democratic camp won a decisive victory in the elections, the left remained without representation among the 199 members of the Hungarian parliament, and its political presence was reduced to the city of Budapest alone.
Six months after the political upheaval, the picture is complex. Positive developments are evident: the courts face less political pressure and are handing down pro-democratic decisions that would have been unimaginable last year, freedom of the press of rebounding, some former ministers suspected of corruption have been arrested, and laws enacted in 2021 that prohibited exposing minors to content about sexual orientation or gender identity have been repealed.
However, judicial appointments are still not being made transparently; it is still unclear how the constitution will be drafted; and the repeal of anti-democratic laws from the Orbán era is proceeding slowly, and there is serious concern that the repeal will be only partial. Péter Magyar, the new prime minister, was elected through direct channels of communication with voters and with almost no support from Hungarian civil society, which nearly collapsed during Orbán’s years in power. As a result, even after Magyar came to power, dialogue between him and civil society figures remains extremely limited.
The process of re-democratization is delicate and complex, carrying with it the risk of vindictiveness and deepening polarization, which could backfire in the next elections. Checks and balances need to be rebuilt, but public trust in the political system must also be restored.
Hungary offers an encouraging example of a democratic process that achieves results, but Orbán’s removal still does not provide answers to the major questions posed by the crisis that liberal democracy currently finds itself in: How can democracy bring about real improvements in the lives of all citizens, including those on the periphery? How can we ensure that voices on the geographic and socioeconomic periphery are heard and influence decision-making? How can a permanent political presence be built in the periphery? What are the best ways to be in communication with young people in ways that are tailored to them? The Hungarians began by limiting the prime minister’s term in office and rehabilitating the judicial system, but it is clear that this is not enough.
There remain more questions than answers regarding the future of democracy in Hungary. In Hungary, as in Israel, defeating populism is only the first stage in a long and difficult process of rebuilding democratic institutions so that they allow freedom for all citizens and protect human rights.
Hungary also faces complex domestic and external challenges, such as migration and the threats posed by Russia. But it does not have to contend with occupation, war crimes, or acute security issues like those facing Israel. Together with rebuilding its democratic institutions, Israel must necessarily continue to contend with the occupation and the war for many more suffering-filled years. Yet with all these differences, the Hungarian experience demonstrates that change can come quickly and unexpectedly, as long as committed citizens preserve political awareness and are prepared to mobilize for change. Hungarians describe how embarrassing it was to be Hungarian abroad over the past decade, and how proud they are of their identity now. Their experience reminds us that history does not move in only one direction, and that even what seems irreversible can be changed.
This article was first published in Hebrew on the website "Local Conversation." You can read the original Hebrew version here.
